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Abstract		
In	the	past	few	years,	spaces	of	transit	have	become	prominent	sites	for	people	seeking	refuge	in	
Europe.	From	railway	stations	and	parks	in	European	cities,	to	informal	settlements	around	Calais,	to	
the	hotspots	in	Italy	and	Greece,	the	movements	of	people	seeking	refuge	and	the	techniques	that	
govern	them	are	at	the	heart	of	what	has	been	misnamed	the	‘European	refugee	crisis’.	Drawing	on	
qualitative	fieldwork,	this	article	takes	spaces	of	transit	as	a	vantage	point	for	interrogating	the	
relationship	between	mobility,	migration	management	and	violence,	focusing	on	the	fracturing	of	
journeys	due	to	barriers	to	accessing	the	EU	and	forced	and	obstructed	mobility	within	the	EU.	We	
develop	the	notion	of	‘politics	of	exhaustion’	to	highlight	the	impact	and	protracted	character	of	
these	forms	of	migration	management	–	its	accumulated	effects	over	time	and	across	spaces	–,	yet	
without	reducing	people	seeking	refuge	to	passive	victims.	Struggles	for	mobility	are	closely	related	
to	the	existence	and	continued	adaptation	of	migration	management	practices.	The	notion	of	
fracturing	can	thus	be	employed	not	only	to	make	sense	of	the	violent	effects	of	migration	
management	but	also	the	ways	in	which	conventional	conceptions	of	state	and	citizenship	are	
challenged	by	the	emergence	of	alternative	living	spaces,	communities	and	politics.	
Key	words:		
migration	management,	spaces	of	transit,	mobility,	violence,	Europe		
1.	Introduction		
In	the	past	few	years,	spaces	of	transit	have	become	prominent	sites	for	displaced	people	
seeking	refuge	in	Europe.	From	railway	stations	and	parks	in	European	cities,	to	informal	settlements	
around	Calais,	to	hotspots	in	Italy	and	Greece,	the	movements	of	displaced	people	and	the	
techniques	that	govern	them	en	route	are	at	the	heart	of	what	has	been	misnamed	the	‘European	
refugee	crisis’.	For	a	start,	the	longest	and	most	dangerous	part	of	people’s	journeys	often	take	place	
outside	of	Europe,	whilst	EU	migration	management	practices	have	been	externalised	to	Africa	and	
Asia.	Secondly,	this	is	not	a	crisis	of	‘spontaneous	arrivals’	but	one	that	has	been	produced	by	
specific	migration	management	strategies	and	practices.		
Drawing	on	qualitative	fieldwork	undertaken	across	Europe,	in	this	article	we	challenge	this	
conception	of	‘crisis’	through	the	perspective	of	spaces	of	transit	in	order	to	expose	the	violence	of	
migration	management,	which	includes	barriers	to	accessing	the	EU	and	forced,	obstructed	and	
circulatory	mobility	within	the	EU.	We	develop	the	notion	of	‘politics	of	exhaustion’	to	highlight	the	
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impact	and	protracted	character	of	this	violence	–	its	accumulated	effects	over	time	and	across	
space	–,	yet	without	reducing	people	seeking	refuge	to	passive	victims.			
Spaces	of	transit	are	spaces	of	passage,	temporary	residence,	containment	and	push-back	for	
people	seeking	refuge	in	Europe	–	both	informal	(e.g.	railway	stations,	parks	and	informal	camps)	
and	institutionalised	(e.g.	hotspots,	reception	centres	and	detention	centres).	These	spaces	vary	in	
character	and	have	changed	over	time:	some	are	temporary,	existing	only	for	a	few	days	or	weeks,	
other	spaces	persist	despite	and/or	due	to	migration	management	practices.	For	instance,	the	so-
called	‘jungle’	in	Calais	became	a	semi-permanent	place	of	passage	and	residence	–	a	town	with	its	
own	infrastructure	and	facilities	–	before	being	destroyed	by	the	French	authorities,	only	to	re-
emerge	in	more	informal	and	precarious	forms	elsewhere.		
Taking	spaces	of	transit	as	a	vantage	point	for	interrogating	the	relationship	between	mobility,	
migration	management	and	violence,	the	article	makes	a	number	of	moves.	Firstly,	it	offers	a	
methodological	move	away	from	analyses	of	migration	that	continue	to	take	states,	territory	and	
citizenship	as	a	starting	point	(Ansems	de	Vries	et	al	2017).	Starting	instead	with	mobility,	the	notion	
of	spaces	of	transit	is	thus	distinct	from	that	of	transit	countries	(e.g.	De	Haas	2007;	Düvell,	
Molodikova	and	Collyer	2014),	which	is	state-centric.1	Rather,	the	question	is	how	spaces	of	transit	
develop	and	are	sustained,	transformed	and/or	destroyed	through	the	practices	of	people	that	pass	
through,	get	stuck,	seek	to	help	and/or	are	employed	to	manage	these	spaces:	practices	of	mobility,	
solidarity,	management	and	violence.	This	methodological	move	thus	enables	approaching	people	
seeking	refuge	as	subjects	rather	than	objects,	taking	seriously	both	their	struggles	for	mobility	and	
the	detrimental	effects	of	migration	management.	In	addition,	it	offers	a	challenge	to	the	idea	of	
‘crisis’	
Secondly,	the	notion	of	spaces	of	transit	shows	that,	rather	than	(spontaneous)	‘flows’	or	
linear	routes	from	A	to	B,	migration	trajectories	are	fractured	and	constantly	changing	due	to	
migration	management	practices.	The	management	of	mobility	thus	consists	of	a	range	of	practices	
of	obstructing,	containing	and	circulating	movement,	which	prevent,	fracture,	complicate	and	
prolong	people’s	journeys	to	and	across	Europe.	
Thirdly,	this	approach	highlights	how	this	managed	and	fractured	mobility	can	be	understood	
as	violence:	both	direct	physical	and	mental	violence	and	a	form	of	structural	violence	(Galtung	
1969)	that	impacts	over	time	and	across	spaces.	We	develop	this	idea	through	the	notion	of	‘politics	
of	exhaustion’,	which	refers	to	the	felt	effects	of	the	stretching	over	time	of	a	combination	of	
fractured	mobility,	daily	violence	and	fundamental	uncertainty.	This	will	be	illustrated	through	a	
discussion	of	the	increasingly	coercive	character	of	migration	management	strategies	in	both	
informal	and	institutionalised	spaces	of	transit,	whereby	these	spaces	are	turned	into	de	facto	
spaces	of	rejection,	detention	and	push-back.	Yet,	the	notion	of	exhaustion	also	takes	seriously	the	
(political)	subjectivity	of	people	seeking	refuge.	The	idea	of	fracturing	can	thus	be	employed	not	only	
to	make	sense	of	the	violent	effects	of	migration	management	but	also	as	an	aspect	of	struggles	for	
mobility	(cf.	Ansems	de	Vries	et	al	2017;	Huysmans	and	Pontes	Nogueira	2016).		
The	research	for	this	article	was	undertaken	as	part	of	the	research	project	‘Documenting	the	
Humanitarian	Migration	Crisis	in	the	Mediterranean’.	The	project	maps	migration	trajectories,	
spaces	of	transit	and	migration	management	practices	across	Europe	with	the	aim	of	developing	a	
response	that	moves	away	from	a	security	framework,	instead	taking	seriously	the	political	and	
																																								 																				
1	As	Cherti	and	Grant	point	out,	what	both	notions	of	transit	have	in	common	is	that	it	enables	states	to	shy	
away	from	developing	long	term	solutions	for	people	seeking	refuge	as	these	people	are	considered	to	be	in	
transit	rather	than	staying,	which	makes	them	more	vulnerable	to	violence	(Cherti	and	Grant	2013).			
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humanitarian	issues	at	play.	We	undertook	qualitative	fieldwork	in	six	transit	points	in	Italy	and	
France	(Lampedusa,	Sicily,	Milan,	Marseille,	Paris	and	Calais).		
2.	Managing	Mobility	outside	Europe	
The	notion	of	crisis	has	been	one	of	the	most	popular	ways	of	describing	the	arrival	of	people	
seeking	refuge	in	Europe	in	the	past	few	years.	The	problem	is	that	‘crisis’	is	easily	identified	with	
‘threat’,	requiring	exceptional	measures	in	a	form	of	‘crisis-led	policy	making’	at	odds	with	
democratic	principles.	Moreover,	such	exceptional	measures	are	increasingly	becoming	the	norm,	
thereby	normalising	the	violence	of	migration	management.	Insufficient	attention	has	been	paid	to	
the	humanitarian	and	political	aspects	of	an	issue	that	has	been	too	readily	framed	in	terms	of	
threat,	emergency	and	insecurity.	In	other	words,	if	there	is	a	‘crisis’	its	manifestation	is	not	the	
security	threat	posed	by	the	arrival	of	people,	but	rather	one	of	people	prevented	from	moving	on	at	
the	borders	of/within	the	EU	(Ansems	de	Vries,	Carrera	and	Guild	2016;	De	Genova	and	Tazzioli	
2016;	Pallister-Wilkins	2015).		
A	second	manifestation	of	this	crisis-thinking	concerns	the	border.	The	proliferation	of	
physical,	technological	and	mental	borders	within	and	outside	the	EU	has	made	the	movement	of	
people	seeking	refuge	into	a	‘crisis’.	Borders	are	understood	here	not	as	lines	to	cross	but	extended	
and	fragmented	zones	of	hold-up,	push-back	and/or	violence	(e.g.	Balibar	2009);	and,	bordering	
practices	are	a	mode	of	migration	management	–	of	preventing,	enabling,	containing	and	circulating	
people’s	movements.	We	will	discuss	a	number	of	forms	of	managing	mobility,	arguing	that	the	
accumulative	effects	of	such	practices	over	time	and	across	spaces	constitute	a	politics	of	
exhaustion.			
The	focus	of	this	section	is	on	the	externalisation	of	bordering	practices,	or	the	prevention	of	
migration	into	the	EU,	which	amounts	to	the	blockage	of	legal	routes	and	the	redirection	of	mobility	
to	irregular	channels.	One	of	the	main	barriers	to	safe	and	legal	passage	to	the	EU,	and	often	the	
first	border	encountered,	is	the	Schengen	visa	regime.	People	are	prevented	from	travelling	by	being	
denied	a	visa	in	an	office	somewhere	in	Africa	or	the	Middle	East,	or	prevented	from	boarding	a	
flight	due	to	carrier	sanctions.		
Most	refugee	producing	countries	in	the	world	are	on	the	EU’s	Schengen	visa	black	list	which	
means	that	their	nationals	must	always	have	a	visa	to	enter	the	Schengen	area.	The	same	is	true	of	
the	UK	national	visa	rules.	In	order	to	obtain	a	short	stay	visa,	a	national	of	a	black	list	country	must	
make	an	application,	provide	extensive	personal	information	about	the	purpose	of	the	visit,	
finances,	good	character	and	other	information	and	provide	fingerprints,	which	will	be	held	in	the	
Visa	Information	System	(VIS)	database	for	five	years	and	made	available	to	law	enforcement.		
In	addition	to	this	financial	obstacle	and	the	burden	of	providing	extensive	information,	
people	are	also	prevented	from	applying	for	a	visa	due	to	their	inability	to	travel	to	consulates,	
especially	those	at	risk	of	persecution.	The	Schengen	Borders	Code	sets	out	complex	rules	as	to	
which	EU	consulate	should	be	responsible	for	determining	a	visa	application.	In	addition,	there	are	
very	few	countries	in	the	world	where	all	Schengen	states	have	consulates	with	the	capacity	to	issue	
visas,	which	means	that	in	large	countries,	a	consulate	capable	of	issuing	a	Schengen	visa	may	be	
thousands	of	kilometres	away.	Yet,	perhaps	the	most	significant	obstacle	is	that	no	visa	exists	for	the	
purpose	of	travelling	to	the	EU	to	seek	asylum.	Anyone	who	proposes	seeking	international	
protection	as	a	reason	for	their	trip	to	the	EU	will	be	refused	a	visa.	Whilst	EU	Member	States	can	
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issue	national	territorially	limited	visas	on	humanitarian	grounds,	they	are	not	required	by	EU	(or	
international)	law	to	do	so.		
This	exclusion	was	challenged	in	2016	by	a	Syrian	family	who	fled	Aleppo	with	their	three	
minor	children	and	went	to	Lebanon.	They	applied	for	humanitarian	visas	to	go	to	Belgium	at	the	
consulate	in	Beirut	informing	the	consulate	that	they	were	not	allowed	to	remain	in	Lebanon	
because	of	the	Lebanese	stop	on	Syrian	refugees.	The	Belgian	authorities	rejected	their	applications	
and	the	family	appealed.	The	national	court	sent	an	urgent	reference	to	the	Court	of	Justice	of	the	
European	Union	seeking	clarification	whether	the	Schengen	Visa	Code	required	them	to	issue	the	
family	with	visas.	That	the	matter	actually	went	to	the	court	is	significant	in	itself:	the	recognition	by	
the	judiciary	that	death	in	the	Mediterranean	is	also	the	result	of	the	failure	of	states	to	issue	visas	
to	people	seeking	refuge	so	that	they	can	travel	safely	and	in	dignity	is	part	of	an	extraordinary	
struggle	to	provide	people	with	alternatives	to	dangerous	travel	routes.2	Yet,	in	its	final	judgement,	
the	court	held	that	it	was	a	matter	for	Belgian	national	law	to	determine	whether	a	humanitarian	
visa	should	be	issued	to	the	family;	the	matter	was	outside	the	scope	of	EU	law.3		
A	second	strategy	of	preventing	people	from	entering	the	EU,	which	also	redirects	people	
towards	irregular	–	and	hence	more	dangerous	and	costly	–	routes,	are	carrier	sanctions.	These	
sanctions	are	normally	monetary	but	can	extend	to	criminal	liability	on	transporters.	The	most	
extensive	carrier	sanction	rules	in	Europe	apply	to	airlines	though	ferry	companies,	bus	and	lorry	
businesses	are	also	covered.	There	is	an	obligation	on	all	airline	businesses	who	bring	people	from	
outside	the	EU	to	the	EU	to	ensure	that	those	passengers	all	have	the	necessary	documents	for	
admission	to	EU	territory.	Through	a	system	of	fines,	states	and	the	EU	thus	seek	to	shift	
responsibility	for	the	border	regime	to	airlines,	which	in	turn	seek	to	shift	risk	through	the	
employment	of	intermediaries,	who	perform	the	checks.	Due	to	this	shifting	of	responsibility,	
airlines	are	reluctant	to	allow	people	on	board	who	do	not	hold	the	appropriate	documents,	even	
though	they	might	have	a	valid	claim	to	asylum	upon	arrival.		
Whilst	this	constitutes	a	significant	obstacle	to	safe	and	legal	passage	to	the	EU,	neither	the	
EU	visa	regime	nor	carrier	sanctions	constitute	successful	strategies	of	preventing	mobility	insofar	as	
it	will	prevent	some	people	from	moving,	yet	it	pushes	many	others	to	obtain	counterfeit	documents	
and/or	seek	alternative,	irregular	routes	into	the	EU.	The	obstruction	of	mobility	as	a	form	of	
migration	management	is	thus	related	to	another	form,	that	of	fractured	mobility.	In	other	words,	
the	externalisation	of	bordering	practices	is	directly	related	to	the	emergence	of	irregular	–	and	
more	dangerous,	costly	and	fractured	–	journeys	as	well	as	to	the	existence	of	institutionalised	and	
informal	spaces	of	transit.	The	latter	are	not	so	much	a	result	of	the	overwhelming	number	of	
people	on	the	move	but	of	their	inability	to	cross	borders	legally.	As	discussed	further	below,	these	
first	obstacles	become	part,	over	time	and	across	spaces,	of	the	politics	of	exhaustion.		
3.	Managing	Mobility	through	Division,	Detention	and	Illegalisation		
The	EU	visa	regime	and	carrier	sanctions	are	a	first	factor	leading	to	fractured	migration	
trajectories,	making	journeys	more	complicated,	costly,	dangerous	and	prolonged.	Those	who	take	
irregular	routes	across	the	sea	often	encounter	a	range	of	other	migration	management	practices	
that	fracture	their	journeys	whilst	travelling	through	and/or	getting	stuck	in	spaces	of	transit.	For	
instance,	they	might	be	identified	and	detained	in	a	hotspot	upon	arrival	in	Europe;	they	might	seek	
																																								 																				
2	C-638/16	X	&	X		PPU	A-G’s	Opinion	7	February	2017.	
3	C-638/16	X	&	X		judgment	7	March	2017.	
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shelter	in	a	park,	railway	station	or	abandoned	building	for	a	few	days	whilst	planning	their	onward	
journey,	or	be	held	up	there	for	weeks	or	months;	they	might	pass	through	an	informal	camp,	or	get	
stuck	there	due	to	the	closure	of	the	border.		
In	the	past	years,	migration	management	practices	in	these	spaces	of	transit	have	become	
increasingly	coercive,	which	has	been	characterised,	for	instance,	by	police	violence,	the	destruction	
of	living	spaces	and	the	denial	of	access	to	rights.	Whilst	marked	differences	exist	between	
institutionalised	and	informal	sites	and	between	temporary	and	permanent	sites,	and	whilst	
circumstances	vary	in	similar	kinds	of	spaces	of	transit,	our	research	suggests	that	these	spaces	are	
increasingly	becoming	zones	of	blockage,	detention	and	push-back.	Focusing	on	the	hotspots	in	Italy	
and	Greece	as	institutionalised	spaces	of	transit,	this	section	discusses	the	management	of	mobility	
through	division,	detention	and	illegalisation	as	another	factor	that	adds	up	to	the	politics	of	
exhaustion.		
Inaugurated	by	the	EU	in	the	second	half	of	2015	as	a	tool	for	the	better	management	of	
migration	with	the	support	of	EU	agencies	such	as	Frontex,	EASO	and	Europol,	hotspot	centres	are	
now	in	operation	on	Lampedusa,	Sicily	and	the	southern	mainland	of	Italy	and	on	the	Greek	Islands.	
Hotspots	can	be	seen	as	geographical	sites	and	as	mechanisms:	border	zones	marked	by	the	
containment	and	fracturing	of	mobility	through	mechanisms	of	identification	and	sorting	–	i.e.	the	
swift	division	between	those	eligible	for	protection	and	those	who	are	not	at	the	point	of	arrival	in	
the	EU.	It	is	a	divide	between	transit	and	relocation	on	the	one	hand,	and	rejection	and	deportation	
on	the	other,	however,	the	latter	is	becoming	increasingly	prominent	in	the	functioning	of	hotspots.		
A	recent	European	Parliament	(2016)	study	acknowledges	the	existence	of	‘obvious	
fundamental	rights	challenges	in	the	pressured	environment	of	the	hotspots’	and	asserts	the	need	
for	a	stand-alone	legal	instrument	to	regulate	the	hotspots.	Yet,	given	that	the	violence	of	these	
practices	are	integral	to	the	mechanism,	the	hotspot	system	itself	must	be	questioned,	not	merely	
its	implementation.	This	violence	is	manifest	in	a	number	of	rights	violations,	including,	firstly,	the	
separation,	in	all	hotspots,	of	people	who	are	and	are	not	eligible	for	protection	on	the	basis	of	
nationality	rather	than	individual	circumstances.	In	Sicily,	we	met	people	from	Nigeria	and	Mali	who	
narrated	how	people	were	physically	separated	upon	arrival	at	the	port,	whereby	they	were	moved	
to	the	group	considered	ineligible	for	claiming	asylum.	Italian	NGOs	and	activists	have	denounced	
this	exclusion	of	people	from	West	African	countries	from	the	protection	mechanism	whilst	those	
from	other	countries	are	regarded	as	potential	refugees.	Moreover,	only	those	from	countries	with	
more	than	75%	international	protection	recognition	–	primarily	Eritreans,	Syrians	and	Iraqis	–	are	
eligible	for	the	Relocation	Programme	(Garelli	and	Tazzioli	2016a;	Sciurba	2016).		
The	denial	of	effective	access	to	the	asylum	system	operates	in	a	second	way,	namely	through	
forced	and	exclusionary	registration	procedures.	In	line	with	the	European	Commission’s	‘no	
registration	no	rights’	motto,	Italian	and	Greek	authorities	have	been	pressured	by	the	EU	to	apply	
identification	procedures	to	all	irregular	arrivals.	In	practice,	this	includes	forced	finger	printing	upon	
arrival.	In	addition,	displaced	people	we	spoke	with	on	Lampedusa	and	Sicily	reported	that	they	had	
been	given	a	(Italian	Home	Office)	form	containing	a	multiple-choice	question	regarding	the	reason	
for	coming	to	Italy.	The	form	does	not	list	war	or	persecution	as	an	explicit	option;	it	would	fall	
under	‘other	reasons’.		Moreover,	the	form	is	written	in	Italian,	which	most	asylum	seekers	do	not	
understand,	hence	it	is	often	completed	by	an	official.	Those	giving	the	‘wrong’	answer,	and/or	
having	the	‘wrong’	nationality,	were	given	a	so-called	‘7-day	decree’,	a	deportation	order	to	leave	
the	country	within	seven	days,	without	having	been	granted	the	opportunity	to	claim	asylum.	This	
means,	in	effect,	that	people	are	illegalised	having	been	denied	the	right	to	ask	for	protection	(Ibid.).	
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In	addition,	not	given	the	means	to	leave	the	country,	they	often	end	up	staying	in	Italy	irregularly,	
walking	around	in	the	streets,	or	trying	to	move	on	irregularly	whilst	living	in	uncertainty	about	their	
future	prospects	in	Europe.		
Another	aspect	of	the	violent	management	of	mobility	functions	as	a	more	direct	obstruction	
to	movement,	at	least	temporarily,	namely	the	detention	of	all	irregular	arrivals	in	closed	facilities	
and	in	conditions	of	indignity,	especially	in	the	hotspots	on	the	Greek	Islands.	For	instance,	the	
hotspot	of	Moria	(Lesvos),	initially	set	up	as	a	centre	of	first	identification,	has	turned	into	a	centre	
of	detention	and	deportation,	including	a	regime	of	differential	detention	and	spatial	segregation	on	
the	basis	of	nationality	(Tazzioli	2016).	Although	conditions	in	Greek	hotspots	are	generally	worse	
than	those	in	Italy,	all	hotspots	have	become	de	facto	detention	and	deportation	centres	(see:	
Garrelli	and	Tazzioli	2016a;	Tazzioli	2016a).	In	addition,	since	the	establishment	of	the	hotspot	
mechanism,	civil	society	organisations	are	often	denied	access	to	the	sites	where	these	procedures	
take	place	rendering	procedures	and	people	invisible.	This	makes	it	difficult	to	monitor	the	effects	of	
this	mechanism	(Sciurba	2016).		
Rather	than	spaces	facilitating	transit,	hotspots	have	become,	for	many	people	seeking	refuge,	
mechanisms	of	rejection,	detention	and	illegalisation,	which	fracture	their	journeys	and	produce	
prolonged	uncertainty	rather	than	protection.	Yet,	for	those	rejected	but	not	deported,	illegalisation	
might	also	enable	mobility	–	the	possibility	of	moving	on	to	other	parts	of	Europe,	albeit	irregularly,	
continuing	their	fractured	journeys.		
4.	Managing	Mobility	through	Obstruction	and	Circulation	
The	situation	in	informal	spaces	of	transit	differs	from	the	hotspots,	however,	these	sites	are	
often	manifestations	of	fractured	mobility,	too:	border	zones	marked	by	increasingly	coercive	
migration	management	practices.	This	takes	the	form	of,	for	instance,	direct	physical	violence	
through	heavy-handed	police	interventions	justified	on	the	basis	of	the	illegalisation	of	people	
seeking	refuge.	In	addition,	we	have	witnessed	the	eviction	and	destruction	of	living	spaces	in	
various	places	across	Europe.	To	name	but	a	few:	the	destruction	of	the	‘jungle’	in	Calais	in	March	
and	October	2016;	the	eviction	of	Lycée	Jean-Quarré	in	Paris,	an	informal	squad	which	hosted	700-
1,000	people	when	they	were	forcefully	removed	in	October	2015;	the	‘cleaning’	up	of	informal	
camps	in	the	railway	station	and	in	parks	in	Milan	in	the	run	up	to	the	2015	Expo	(Ansems	de	Vries	
2016b;	Ansems	de	Vries,	Garelli	and	Tazzioli	2016).		
To	take	the	example	of	the	‘jungle’,	the	area	around	Calais	has	a	long	history	of	the	
emergence,	existence	and	destruction	of	informal	settlements,	which	is	directly	related	to	people’s	
inability	to	cross	the	Channel	to	the	UK.	The	latest	settlement	emerged	in	the	spring	of	2015	and	
slowly	developed	into	a	thriving	town	with	its	own	infrastructure	and	facilities,	although	against	the	
background	of	a	range	of	increasingly	violent	bordering	techniques,	leading	to	its	phased	
destruction.	Having	first	‘cleared’	a	100-meter	strip	in	January	2016,	the	French	authorities	
bulldozed	a	much	larger	part	of	the	settlement	in	March	2016,	including	people’s	homes	and	
community,	educational	and	religious	buildings,	followed	by	the	destruction	of	the	entire	‘jungle’	in	
October	2016.	Whilst	the	French	authorities	did	order	the	construction	an	alternative	‘official’	camp	
to	accommodate	people	after	the	March	2016	eviction,	this	‘container	camp’	offered	too	few	
spaces,	little	privacy	and	controversial	identification	procedures.	It	was	therefore	seen	as	part	of	the	
authorities’	deterrence	strategy	rather	than	a	humanitarian	response.		
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Whilst,	in	some	ways,	migration	management	in	the	Calais	border	zone	has	been	marked	by	
the	prevention	of	mobility	–	of	crossing	the	border	to	the	UK	–	we	will	focus	on	two	other	aspects,	
namely	strategies	of	fractured	circulation	and	of	exhaustion.	In	order	to	develop	these	points,	it	is	
useful	to	consider	the	temporality	of	different	bordering	practices	by	juxtaposing	the	protracted	and	
fractured	character	of	border	zones	with	the	swift	decisions	taken	at	the	official	border.	In	brief,	for	
people	unable	to	obtain	a	Schengen	visa,	journeys	to	and	across	Europe	can	take	months	or	years	
and	might	include	being	held	up	or	detained	in,	or	circulated	around,	border	zones	for	lengthy	
periods	of	time.	For	those	in	possession	of	a	visa,	whilst	the	visa	application	process	itself	might	be	
complicated	and	lengthy,	the	subsequent	encounter	with	the	border	might	be	a	lot	swifter.		
According	to	the	EU’s	external	border	agency,	Frontex	(2014),	a	border	guard	has	12	seconds	
to	decide	whether	to	admit	or	refuse	admission	to	a	third	country	national.	These	12-second	
decisions	have	significant	implications:	Frontex	states	that	border	guards	in	the	EU	refused	
admission	to	118,495	people	in	2015.	This	was	consistent	with	the	previous	year	according	to	the	
most	recent	Frontex	annual	risk	analysis	(Frontex	2016).	The	same	document	indicates	that	around	
222	million	passengers	fly	into	the	EU	each	year.	The	most	common	reason	for	refusal	was	a	lack	of	
appropriate	documentation	justifying	the	purpose	and	conditions	of	his	or	her	stay.	Thus,	a	12-
second	decision,	in	combination	with	the	fact	that	seeking	asylum	is	not	recognised	as	a	valid	reason	
for	travel,	might	not	only	push	people	towards	irregular	and	unsafe	journeys	to	the	EU,	it	might	also	
radically	change	the	temporality	of	their	journeys	and	their	encounters	with	the	border	regime.				
For	those	unable	to	take	a	regular	route,	it	might	take	from	months	to	years	to	travel	to	and	
across	Europe.	During	our	fieldwork,	people	described	trajectories	that	involved	being	pushed	back	
from	one	country	to	another,	being	detained	for	shorter	or	longer	periods,	or	being	circulated	
around	–	for	instance,	from	Calais	to	the	South	of	France	and	back	again	to	Calais	–	what	Martina	
Tazzioli	has	referred	to	as	‘containment	through	mobility’	(Tazzioli	2017).	Others	we	spoke	to	in	
Calais	had	crossed	Europe	more	than	once,	with	deportations	and	periods	of	detention	fracturing	
their	journeys.	Some	spoke	of	repeated	deportations	to	eastern	or	southern	Europe,	where	their	
fingerprints	had	been	taken	upon	entry	to	the	EU	–	thus	requiring	them	to	claim	asylum	there	–	but	
where	violence	and	unsustainable	living	conditions	compelled	them	to	return	to	Calais.	Others	were	
deported	to	their	country	of	origin	and,	feeling	unsafe	there,	embarked	on	a	second	journey	to	
Europe.	This	fractured	mobility	is	a	key	aspect	of	the	politics	of	exhaustion.	More	precisely,	the	
alteration	of	forced	and	obstructed	mobility,	e.g.	through	detention,	leads	to	physical	and	mental	
exhaustion	(Ansems	de	Vries	and	Welander	2016a;	Ansems	de	Vries	and	Welander	2016b).		
In	brief,	rather	than	a	movement	from	insecurity	to	safety,	migration	trajectories	are	often	
characterised	by	recurring	or	continued	displacement.	The	stretching	over	time	and	across	spaces	of	
this	fractured	and	circulatory	management	of	mobility	is	experienced	as	exhausting.	These	notions	
of	fractured	mobility	and	politics	of	exhaustion	emerged	through	our	conversations	with	people	
displaced	across	Europe.	We	started	our	research	with	the	idea	that	the	non-linear	and	protracted	
character	of	migration	trajectories	is	produced	through	bordering	practices.	Yet,	it	was	only	by	
listening	to	people’s	stories	and	noticing	the	regular	use	of	expressions	such	as	‘feeling	so	tired’	and	
having	been	‘completely	exhausted’,	that	fracturing	and	exhaustion	–	as	both	a	politics	and	a	felt	
experience	–	became	meaningful	concepts	in	the	context	of	spaces	of	transit.	For	instance,	in	Calais,	
people	told	us	they	felt	‘completely	exhausted’	due	to	repeated	evictions,	detention,	push-backs	and	
deportations,	as	well	as	untreated	health	problems,	below-standard	living	conditions,	the	
continuous	threat	and	reality	of	violence,	and	the	uncertainty	of	their	daily	lives	and	their	future	
prospects	in	Europe	(Ansems	de	Vries	and	Welander	2016a;	Ansems	de	Vries	and	Welander	2016b).	
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A	similar	sense	of	exhaustion	was	expressed	by	others	on	fractured	journeys,	often	waiting	in	
uncertainty	for	long	periods	of	time.	Whether	in	reception/detention	centres	in	Italy	or	in	informal	
settlements	in	Northern	France,	the	stretching	over	time	of	uncertainty	seriously	affected	people’s	
mental	well-being,	and	can	be	understood	as	a	form	of	violence.	This	was	often	expressed	in	terms	
of	‘going	mad’	or	the	idea	that	‘people	go	crazy’	here.		
The	politics	of	exhaustion	can	thus	be	understood	as	a	form	of	structural	violence	that	impacts	
and	intensifies	over	time	as	people	continue	to	be	pushed	across	and	held	up	in	a	range	of	
institutionalised	and	informal	spaces	of	transit,	and	which	also	includes	forms	of	direct,	daily	
violence.	Yet,	this	is	not	to	say	that	people	seeking	refuge	are	simply	the	victims	of	strategies	of	
forced	and	obstructed	mobility.	Their	continued	efforts	to	move	to/across	Europe	to	find	a	space	of	
safety	and	build	a	life,	despite	the	myriad	obstacles	encountered	en	route,	is	testament	to	their	
active	political	subjectivity.4	One	man	we	met	in	Northern	France	offered	a	pithy	observation	that	
seemed	to	help	him	retain	hope	of	reaching	the	UK	as	well	as	a	sense	of	active	agency:	having	
crossed	so	many	borders,	now	there	is	‘only	one	more	border	to	cross.’		
Struggles	for	mobility	–	both	to	move	on	and	to	stay	put	in	certain	places	–	are	closely	related	
to	the	existence	and	continued	adaptation	of	migration	management	practices	on	behalf	of	the	EU	
and	national	governments.	The	emergence	and	re-emergence	of	informal	spaces	of	transit	across	
Europe	shows	that,	despite	strategies	of	exhaustion,	people	continue	to	try	and	build	lives	and	
communities	and	to	protest	against	their	illegalisation	and	the	violence	of	migration	management.	
This	also	has	implications	for	the	notion	of	fracturing:	it	can	be	deployed	not	only	to	describe	the	
complex	and	protracted	character	of	people’s	journeys	due	to	migration	management	practices	but	
also	the	ways	in	which	conventional	conceptions	of	state	and	citizenship	are	challenged	by	the	
emergence	of	alternative	living	spaces,	communities	and	politics	(Ansems	de	Vries	et	al	2017).	
5.	Conclusion	
The	framing	of	the	arrival	of	people	seeking	refuge	in	Europe	in	security	and	policing	terms	is	
not	only	problematic	in	the	sense	that	it	presents	(violent)	migration	management	and	bordering	
practices	as	the	solution	rather	than	part	of	the	problem.	In	addition,	it	carries	the	danger	of	
rendering	rights	violations	invisible	and	it	negates	the	role	of	these	practices	in	the	co-production	of	
insecurity.	Moreover,	these	practices	underlie	the	highly	differential	ability	of	people	seeking	refuge	
to	move	to	and	across	Europe,	depending	on	their	nationality,	visa	and	financial	status	and	their	
ability	to	facilitate	irregular	mobility,	putting	some	of	the	most	vulnerable	at	a	clear	disadvantage	
rather	than	protecting	them.	
For	those	travelling	irregularly,	spaces	of	transit	are	both	key	sites	for	the	facilitation	of	
movement	and,	increasingly,	border	zones	that	render	them	subject	to	a	range	of	coercive	practices	
of	migration	management,	including	practices	of	division,	detention,	deportation,	push-back,	
containment	and	forced	(circulatory)	mobility.	Both	institutionalised	and	informal	spaces	of	transit	
have	become	sites	where	people’s	mobility	is	regulated	in	a	way	that	breaches	their	rights,	renders	
them	illegal	and	subject	to	violent	and	protracted	interventions	that	would	be	considered	illegal	in	
‘normal’	circumstances.		
																																								 																				
4	In	the	past	years	a	body	of	literature	has	emerged	arguing	that	people	seeking	refuge	are	active	political	
subjects	rather	than	mere	passive	victims.	This	literature	includes	key	concepts	such	as	agency	(Bulley	2014;	
McNevin	2013;	Nyers	2003,2006;	Rygiel2011),	acts	of	citizenship	(Aradau,	Huysmans	and	Squire	2010;	Isin	and	
Nielsen	2008),	autonomy	of	migration	(Mezzadra	2011;	Mezzadra	and	Neilson	2003;	Papadopoulus	et	al	2008;	
Scheel	2013)	and	governance-resistance	(Ansems	de	Vries	2016a:	Ansems	de	Vries	et	al	2017).			
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The	production	and	reproduction	of	the	‘crisis’	–	as	a	political	effort	in	the	pursuit	of	migration	
management	–	is	therefore	closely	associated	with	the	detrimental	humanitarian	circumstances	that	
have	emerged	in	both	institutional	and	informal	spaces	of	transit.	The	politics	of	exhaustion,	as	the	
violent	impact	of	the	stretching	over	time	and	across	spaces	of	these	practices	of	managing	mobility	
is	a	clear	manifestation	of	this	humanitarian	crisis.	Hence,	a	sustainable	‘solution’	must	start	with	a	
reconsideration	of	the	EU	border	regime	itself.	This	would	mean	a	careful	unpacking	of	the	role	of	
existing	migration	management	practices	in	(re)producing	the	‘crisis’,	including	the	visa	regime,	
carrier	sanctions,	the	hotspot	mechanism,	access	to	the	asylum	system,	the	securitisation	of	border	
controls,	practices	of	forced	mobility	and	attacks	on	informal	living	spaces.		
In	addition,	any	sustainable	political	and	humanitarian	response	must	take	seriously	people’s	
agency.	Despite	the	criminalisation	of	and	violence	against	people	seeking	refuge,	and	the	extensive	
efforts	to	obstruct	and	manage	mobility,	people	continue	to	move	to	and	across	Europe	and	to	pass	
through	and	reside	in	spaces	of	transit.	An	understanding	of	their	connections	and	networks	of	
friends	and	families,	their	backgrounds,	skills	and	experiences,	and	their	ideas	and	desires	for	
building	their	future	lives	is	crucial	for	developing	humane	and	effective	policies	of	welcoming,	
resettlement	and	relocation.	
At	a	more	conceptual	level,	this	means	that	the	notion	of	fracturing	in	the	context	of	
migration	can	be	deployed	not	only	to	the	describe	the	complex	and	protracted	mobility	of	people	
seeking	refuge	in	Europe	as	a	result	of	migration	management	but	also	the	ways	in	which	
conventional	conceptions	of	migration	based	around	ideas	of	state	and	citizenship	are	challenged	by	
the	emergence	and	existence	of	informal	spaces	of	transit,	which	include	the	development	of	
alternative	living	spaces,	communities	and	politics.	These	spaces	are	simultaneously	a	product	of	and	
subject	to	the	violence	of	migration	management	and	become	sites	where	these	practices	are	
resisted,	both	through	continued	struggles	to	move	on	and	through	place-making,	or	the	effort	to	
turn	these	spaces	into	communities	of	solidarity.	
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